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Presidential Foreign Policy: An 
Opportunity for International 
Law Education 
Laurie R. Blank* 
This essay explores an interesting opportunity for the 
president in the foreign policy arena: the role of educator 
on international law and its central principles, for both 
the president and his surrogates in the executive branch. 
In the current environment in which the United States is 
engaged in extensive, wide-ranging, and challenging 
military operations against diverse foes, this educational 
role has significant potential in the arena of the law of 
armed conflict specifically. With reference to historical 
and current examples of how presidents have used—or 
not used—international law as an effective 
communication medium, this essay highlights how the 
president can communicate effective messages with 
regard to international law, and the law of armed conflict 
in particular, to the public through a much more focused 
and proactive view of the president as an educator in this 
area. 
 
On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait, its 
tiny neighbor to the southeast. Under the leadership of President 
George H.W. Bush, the United States marshaled a multinational 
coalition, secured UN authorization for the use of force, and launched 
military operations to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and liberate 
Kuwait.1 On the eve of Operation Desert Storm, the military 
operations launched on January 16, 1991, President Bush spoke to the 
nation, explaining the background to and purpose of Operation Desert 
Storm.2 In so doing, he set forth a comprehensive and effective 
description of jus ad bellum and the U.S. justification for using force 
against Iraq in that instance. 
* Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University 
School of Law. I would like to thank Tariq Mohideen (JD expected 
2013, Emory Law School) for his creative and helpful research assistance 
in the preparation of this essay. 
1. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT: AN 
INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS, 1-1 (1991), available at http://www. 
dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/PersianGulfWar/305.pdf. 
2. President George H.W. Bush, Speech Announcing U.S. Attack on Iraq, 
1991 (Jan. 16, 1991) [hereinafter President Bush Speech], available at 
http://infousa.state.gov/government/overview/bush_iraq.html. 
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Jus ad bellum is the Latin term for the law governing the resort to 
force, that is, when a state may use force within the constraints of the 
UN Charter framework and traditional legal principles.3 The UN 
Charter prohibits the use of force by one state against another in 
Article 2(4): “All members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”4 International 
law provides for three exceptions to this prohibition on the use of 
force: consent, UN Security Council authorization for a multinational 
operation, and self-defense. The last of these exceptions formed the 
foundation for US action in the Persian Gulf in 1991. 
Under Article 51 and the historical right of self-defense, a state 
can use force in individual or collective self-defense in response to an 
armed attack as long as the force used is necessary and proportionate 
to the goal of repelling the attack or ending the grievance.5 Thus, the 
law focuses on whether the defensive act is appropriate in relation to 
the ends sought. The requirement of proportionality in jus ad bellum 
measures the extent of the use of force against the overall military 
goals, such as fending off an attack or subordinating the enemy. The 
requirement of necessity addresses whether there are adequate non-
forceful options to deter or defeat the attack. To this end, “acts done 
in self-defense must not exceed in manner or aim the necessity 
provoking them.”6 
In his January 16th speech, President Bush addressed each of 
these components of jus ad bellum in turn, essentially providing the 
American people with a primer for the international law governing the 
use of force. First, President Bush identified the armed attack—the 
trigger for any use of force in self-defense: “the dictator of Iraq 
invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait . . . was crushed; its 
3. The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force with two 
exceptions: the right to self-defense and the multilateral use of force 
authorized by the Security Council under Article 42. U.N. Charter art. 
2, para. 4 (prohibiting the use of force); id. art. 51 (recognizing the 
inherent right of self-defense); id. art. 42 (providing for the 
authorization of multilateral use of force). 
4. Id. art. 2, para. 4. 
5. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 246 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
102–04 (June 27); Jus ad Bellum, Partial Award, Ethiopia v. Eritrea, at 
2–7 (Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, 2005), http://www.pca-cpa.org/ 
upload/files/FINAL%20ET%20JAB.pdf. 
6. Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 132 (1986). 
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people, brutalized.”7 Second, President Bush introduced the collective 
action to defend Kuwait against that armed attack: “the 28 countries 
with forces in the Gulf area hav[ing] exhausted all reasonable efforts 
to reach a peaceful resolution—have no choice but to drive Saddam 
from Kuwait by force.”8 Third, President Bush showed that the 
United States was in compliance with the principle of necessity: 
“[s]anctions were tried for well over 5 months, and we and our allies 
concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from 
Kuwait,” and “[r]egrettably, we now believe that only force will make 
him leave.”9 Finally, President Bush also showed the United States 
was complying with the principle of proportionality: “[o]ur goal is not 
the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation of Kuwait,” and “[o]ur 
objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein’s forces will leave Kuwait. The 
legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, 
and Kuwait will once again be free.”10 President Bush may not have 
used the legal term jus ad bellum or referenced specific provisions of 
the UN Charter, but he nonetheless offered a remarkably clear 
statement of the legal parameters for U.S. action and how the U.S. 
operation fit squarely within international legal frameworks. 
President Bush’s speech highlights an interesting opportunity for 
the President in the foreign policy arena: the role of educator on 
international law and its central principles. President Woodrow 
Wilson and President Franklin Roosevelt also engaged in this type of 
dialogue with presentations to the American public, most notably 
with respect to the League of Nations and the US entrance into 
World War II, respectively.11 In the post-9/11 world, both President 
George W. Bush and President Obama have had countless 
opportunities to engage in such an educational role with regard to 
international law. And yet few of those opportunities have been 
seized, at least in as direct and effective a way as the example 
described above from Operation Desert Storm. 
7. President Bush Speech, supra note 2.  
8. Id. 
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
11. See President Woodrow Wilson, Final Addresses in Support of the 
League of Nations (Sept. 25, 1919), available at https://www.mt 
holyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ww40.htm (attempting to “remove the 
impressions” and “check the falsehoods” surrounding the League of 
Nations); President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to Congress 
Requesting a Declaration of War (Dec. 8, 1941), available at http:// 
millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3324 (addressing the nation 
regarding the state of affairs after the Japanese attacks in Hawaii and 
throughout the Pacific). 
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Soon after the 9/11 attacks made al-Qaeda a household word 
throughout the United States and much of the world, the Bush 
Administration characterized US efforts to defeat al-Qaeda and 
associated terrorist groups as a “war on terror.”12 One response to the 
attacks could have been to reinforce the United States’ commitment 
to the rule of law, no matter who its foe or how they fought. In 
contrast, however, for the first several years, the rhetoric of the war 
on terror facilitated and encouraged the growth of authority without 
the corresponding spread of obligation in many cases. One of the 
unfortunate consequences of the use of the rhetoric of a “war on 
terror” was a growing sense that “war” can displace law and rights. 
As Harold Hongju Koh (Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of 
State from 2009–2013) wrote soon after the 9/11 attacks: “In the days 
since, I have been struck by how many Americans—and how many 
lawyers—seem to have concluded that, somehow, the destruction of 
four planes and three buildings has taken us back to a state of nature 
in which there are no laws or rules.”13 Similarly, the Bush 
Administration often promoted the more explicit notion that some 
people simply fall outside the bounds of the law. Thus, the US 
government took the approach that persons detained in the course of 
operations against al-Qaeda are neither combatants nor civilians—
terms with specific protective connotations under the law of armed 
conflict—but rather, that they fell outside the law’s existing 
parameters. Indeed, the highly problematic statement that the 
Geneva Conventions did not apply to members of al-Qaeda, and 
sometimes even the Taliban, was a common refrain in the early years 
of the war on terror.14 In effect, the Bush Administration did not 
simply avoid an active educational role with regard to international 
law; rather, in many cases, it went in the other direction entirely and 
eschewed international law principles in its public pronouncements, 
leaving the public in the dark about guiding norms and principles 
applicable to current events. 
12. See President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress 
(Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/us/gen. 
bush.transcript_1_joint-session-national-anthem-citizens?_s=PM:US.  
13. Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 23 
(2002). Koh continues: “In fact, over the years, we have developed an 
elaborate system of domestic and international laws, institutions, 
regimes, and decision-making procedures precisely so that they will be 
consulted and obeyed, not ignored, at a time like this.” Id. 
14. See, e.g., Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Humane 
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available 
at http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/foia/pdf/detainee/Humane%20Tre 
atment%20of%20al%20Qaeda%20and%20Taliban%20Detainees.pdf 
(determining that various articles of the Third Geneva Convention do 
not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees). 
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The Obama Administration has seemed outwardly to take a 
wholly opposite tack, especially in the past few years. At the 
beginning of his first term, President Obama regularly referred—at 
least in broad strokes—to international principles when announcing 
efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center or to eliminate 
all coercive forms of interrogation, for example.15 The exponential 
increase in the use of drone strikes, however, produced the most 
notable and comprehensive engagement with international law of 
President Obama’s first term. Beginning with then-Legal Advisor 
Koh’s speech in March 2010 and culminating in a series of speeches 
by senior Obama Administration officials throughout 2011 and 2012, 
the President appeared to offer extensive explanation of the 
international legal principles governing the use of drone strikes 
against al-Qaeda operatives in various locations around the globe. At 
first, the Administration announced that the United States was using 
targeted strikes because it “is engaged in an armed conflict or [is 
acting] in legitimate self-defense.”16 Subsequent addresses by 
Department of Defense General Counsel Jeh Johnson,17 Attorney 
General Eric Holder,18 and senior counterterrorism advisor John O. 
Brennan19 continued this same theme of a combination of law of war 
and jus ad bellum paradigms to justify and explain the parameters for 
the use of targeted strikes. On first glance, these speeches seem to 
accomplish precisely the same purpose and effect as the 1991 speech 
by President Bush noted above: clear statements of international law 
and reasons for US action. However, the United States’ insistence on 
referring to both legal paradigms as justification for individual attacks 
and the broader program of targeted strikes raises significant concerns 
15. See Mark Tran, Obama Signs Order to Close Guantanamo Bay, THE 
GUARDIAN (UK), Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world 
/2009/jan/22/hillary-clinton-diplomatic-foreign-policy.  
16. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, US Dep’t of State, Keynote Address 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Soc’y of Int’l Law: The Obama 
Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. 
17. Jeh Johnson, Dep’t of Defense General Counsel, National Security Law, 
Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012), 
available at http://www.cfr.org/national-security-and-defense/jeh-john 
sons-speech-national-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obama-
administration/p27448.  
18. Eric Holder, Attorney General, Remarks Regarding Targeted Killing at 
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-the-law/holders-speech-targeted-
killing-march-2012/p27562. 
19. John O. Brennan, White House Counter Terrorism Adviser, Speech on 
US Drone Strikes Targeted at al-Qaida at the Woodrow Wilson Center 
(Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/05/01/1517 
78804/john-brennan-delivers-speech-on-drone-ethics. 
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for the use of international law and the protection of individuals by 
blurring the lines between the key parameters of the two paradigms.20 
In reality, therefore, the series of speeches ultimately undermined the 
educational possibilities in the service of a specific policy goal. 
Notwithstanding political pressures and the broader needs of 
policy, it is possible to conceive of an effective educational role for the 
President and his surrogates in the executive branch with regard to 
international law. Indeed, in the current environment in which the 
United States is engaged in extensive, wide-ranging, and challenging 
military operations against diverse foes, this educational role has 
significant potential in the arena of the law of armed conflict. 
President George W. Bush’s approach suggested a disregard for law 
and morality in the conduct of military operations—a message that 
was loudly and clearly communicated to the public, whether by word 
or by deed. President Obama’s approach suggests a much greater 
comfort level with international law and willingness to reference and 
rely on international legal principles for policy purposes, but evinces 
an unfortunate manipulation of the law that can have problematic 
effects over time. In an ideal world, the President can communicate 
three effective messages with regard to international law, particularly 
the law of armed conflict, to the public through a much more focused 
and proactive view of the President as an educator in this area. 
First, the law of armed conflict has at its core principles of honor, 
morality, and dignity that look much like the principles underlying 
our own constitutional rights and protections in the United States. 
Humane treatment and respect for the rule of law are common 
threads in domestic law and international law and thus can form the 
foundation for a productive conversation about why compliance with 
the law of armed conflict is a positive feature of rather than a 
negative imposition on US operations. 
Second, international law, and specifically the law of armed 
conflict, facilitates US effectiveness by creating a framework within 
which the United States can engage with allies and foes alike. The law 
forms a constraint, but also creates opportunity, and this notion of 
law as a medium for increased possibility and effectiveness is rarely 
presented to the public at large. Rather, international law is too often 
portrayed as an external constraint that interferes in the 
government’s ability to accomplish its goals. Here, the President can 
play a significant role in educating the American public about the 
value of international law (whether the law of armed conflict or other 
areas of international law) in facilitating relations between states and  
20. See generally Laurie R. Blank, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of 
Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, 38 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1655 (2012). 
106 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Presidential Foreign Policy 
protecting U.S. service members and civilians in a dangerous and 
complex world environment. 
Finally, the United States has been at the heart of nearly all 
major developments in international law and the law of armed conflict 
over the past century and more. The President should seize the 
opportunity to educate the American public regarding the role the 
United States has historically played in the development of the law 
and why the United States has promoted such developments. An 
obvious example is the International Criminal Court. Notwithstanding 
the United States’ reluctance to join the Rome Statute,21 it would be 
useful for the American public to understand the United States’ view 
of the value of international criminal justice and its contribution to 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Recognizing 
the role the United States has played can only help the American 
public develop a more nuanced understanding of how and why the 
United States engages on a variety of levels in the international legal 
arena. 
These three messages require a more sophisticated conversation 
about international law, about the United States’ place in the 
international community, and about the complexities of constraint 
and opportunity inherent in international law. Taking on this 
educational role may thus be more complicated, especially with regard 
to the relationship between law and policy, but offers long-term 
benefits for both the government and the public that should not be 
overlooked. 
 
21. Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, The United States and the 
International Criminal Court 5 (Harvard Uni., Working Paper T-00-02), 
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20 
Papers/ICC.pdf.  
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